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I. INTRODUCTION
"Behavioral law and economics"--the general topic of this
Symposium-seeks to bring together "behavior" and "law and economics." Law and economics (without the modifier) is of course already
about behavior. But it is typically about behavior of a particular sort:
highly "rational" (in a particular sense of that term), optimizing behavior. Sometimes it is reasonable to assume that people behave in

*
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Class of 1999), Todd Murtha (Harvard Law School Class of 1998), and Gil Seinfeld (Harvard
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this manner; other times it is not.' The "behavioral" in "behavioral
law and economics" is about infusing law and economics with insights
into actual (rather than hypothesized) human behavior when such
insights are needed to insure sound predictions or prescriptions about
law.
Behavioral law and economics is not a critique of law and economics. It shares with that approach to the law the view that human
behavior is organized by predictable patterns, which enable the analyst to generate models (often formal ones) and testable hypotheses
about the effects of legal rules. And it shares the view that such
analysis is an important and valuable pursuit, one most worthy of
legal scholars' attention. Where it disagrees with conventional law
and economics is about the shape of the predictable patterns of human behavior. Its goal is to offer better predictions and prescriptions
about law based on improved accounts of how people actually behave.
This Essay offers a behavioral economic analysis of redistributive legal rules. Redistributive legal rules are rules chosen for their
effects in shifting wealth from high-income to low-income individuals
(progressive redistribution). The desirability of such rules has been
the subject of intense debate within the legal community. Many law
and economics scholars have urged that legal rules be chosen solely
with an eye towards Kaldor-Hicks efficiency (which I will call simply
"efficiency" for the remainder of this Essay); these scholars often urge
that distributional considerations be addressed (if they are to be addressed at all) exclusively through the tax and welfare systems.2 On
this view, distributive goals do not provide a basis for choosing an
inefficient legal rule-although they might, it seems, provide a basis
for choosing between two efficient rules. 3 Other legal scholars have
argued that the selection of legal rules should be informed by distributional considerations even at the expense of efficiency. 4 I will call

a rule "redistributive" if it makes such a trade-off between distributive objectives and efficiency.

1.
See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1485-87 (1998).
2.
See, e.g., A. MITCHELL PoLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 124-27
(2d ed. 1989); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the
Income Tax in RedistributingIncome, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).
3.
See Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Economics from the Perspective of Critical Legal
Studies, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAw 465, 469-70 (Peter
Newman ed., 1998).

4.

See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100

YALE L.J. 1211, 1224 n.36 (1991); Kennedy, supranote 3, at 469-71.
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A recurring theme in the debate over redistributive legal rules
has been the relative cost of redistributing wealth through legal rules
(defined to mean rules other than those that directly relate to the tax
and welfare systems) and redistributing wealth through the tax and
welfare systems (which I will call simply "the tax system" or "taxes"
for the remainder of this Essay). Under the assumptions of neoclassical economics, any desired level of redistribution can be achieved at
lower cost through the tax system than through legal rules.i This is
not because the tax system can redistribute wealth costlessly; the
animating feature of both lawyers' and economists' analyses of tax
schemes is their potential to distort people's work incentives. Higher
taxes on the wealthy will tend to discourage people from earning high
incomes. But from the perspective of neoclassical economics, precisely
the same is true of redistributive legal rules: "[U]sing legal rules to
redistribute income distorts work incentives fully as much as the
income tax system-because the distortion is caused by the redistribution itself ... "6 Thus, for example, a thirty percent marginal
tax rate, together with an inefficient legal rule that redistributes an
average of one percent of high earners' income to the poor, creates the
same distortion in work incentives as a thirty-one percent marginal
7
tax rate coupled with an efficient, non-redistributive legal rule.

However, the former regime also entails costs due to the inefficient
legal rule. (For example, under a redistributive tort rule, potential
defendants may be excessively cautious and thus may be discouraged
from engaging in socially valuable activities.) Thus, whatever the
desired level of redistribution, it can always be achieved at lower cost
by choosing the efficient legal rule and increasing the degree of redistribution through the tax system than by choosing an inefficient rule
because of its distributive properties.8
A basic premise about human behavior underlies this analysis:
work incentives will be distorted by the same amount as a result of a
probabilistic, law-based mode of redistribution (such as tort law) as
they will be as a result of a tax. Thus, for example, if high-income
individuals face a .02 probability of incurring tort liability for an
accident, then a redistributive legal regime that imposes $500,000
5.
See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2; Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs.
DistributionalEquity in Legal Rulemaking: Should DistributionalEquity Matter Given Optimal
Income Taxation? 71 Am. ECON. REV. 414 (1981). The point is originally due to the Shavell
article.
6.
Kaplow & Shavell, supranote 2, at 667-68.
7.
See id. at 668.
8.
See id.
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extra in damages (beyond what an efficient rule would call for) would
distort work incentives by the same amount as a tax of $10,000;
$10,000 is the expected cost of both the tax and the redistributive tort
rule. (Of course, risk-averse actors may choose to purchase insurance
against tort liability in such situations; the role of insurance in this
analysis is discussed in Part II.A.2 below.)
Why should redistributive legal rules and taxes have the same
effects on work incentives? "[W]hen an individual... contemplates
earning additional income by working harder, his total marginal
expected payments [out of that income] equal the sum of his marginal
tax payment and the expected marginal cost on account of accidents." 9
The expected costs of the two forms of redistribution are the same,
and thus behavior is affected in the same way. At least that is the assumption that neoclassical economics makes.
Is this assumption valid? Would an individual typically experience the same disincentive to work as a result of a more generous
(to victims) tort regime as would be experienced as a result of a higher
level of taxation? Behavioral law and economics suggests that the
answer may be no (although, as emphasized below, only empirical
evidence that we do not yet have can definitively resolve the
question). One reason for this conclusion stems from the fact that
uncertain events-such as incurring tort liability-are often processed
very differently from certain events. And taxes, to paraphrase Ben
Franklin, are (along with death) nothing if not certain. (The possibility of uncertain or randomized taxation is discussed in Part Ill below.)
A second reason for the difference between the two forms of
redistribution is that they may be charged to different "mental accounts." As described below, some costs may be viewed as direct
charges against income, while others may be viewed as different sorts
of "expenditures," which may affect work incentives differently.
These points about redistributive legal rules do not, I will
argue, suggest that people sometimes overestimate, but other times
underestimate, the effects of such rules. If this were true, then on
average the errors might cancel, or, at least, there would be no good
way to predict the direction of the errors. Indeed, a suggestion along
just these lines has been offered by Professors Louis Kaplow and
Steven Shavell: if people "misestimat[e] the extent of redistribution
[through legal rules], there is no compelling reason to assume that
their guesses [will] be too low rather than too high."10 This Essay
9.
10.

Id. at 671.
Id. at 671 n.5.
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advances the contrary view that the costs of redistributive legal rules
are more likely to be underestimated than to be overestimated, and,
thus, that work incentives may be distorted less by redistributive
legal rules than by taxes.
One might then wonder whether markets will correct this
"problem." Won't those who fail to understand the equivalence between the two types of redistribution be driven out? In a competitive
market, this may occur; firms in such markets might lose money and
be replaced if they failed to appreciate the equivalence." But similar
pressures do not exist for individuals (and for firms not in competitive
markets); for these actors, the type of behavior identified here will not
be weeded out by the market. 2 Because my analysis applies primarily to individuals rather than firms, I refer to the relevant decision
makers as "individuals."
Part H below develops a behavioral economic analysis of redistributive legal rules and explains why, under this analysis, work incentives may be distorted less by these rules than by taxes.'8 (Again,
a definitive resolution of this issue is not possible without empirical
evidence that we currently do not have.) Part IH discusses the
possibility of randomized taxes, designed to mimic the uncertainty
aspect of redistributive legal rules. My conclusion here is that
political feasibility and other considerations suggest serious
difficulties with using randomized taxes for this purpose. Part IV
briefly discusses other dimensions (besides the effects on work incentives) of the comparison between redistributive legal rules and taxes.
Throughout the Essay I focus on the particular context of
redistributive tort rules that operate between strangers (as opposed to
between, say, firms and the consumers of their products-parties in a
preexisting contractual relationship). This focus tracks that of much
of the existing literature on redistributive legal rules. 4 The analysis
of redistributive legal rules in settings such as contract law differs in

11. See Joils et al., supranote 1, at 1486, for a general discussion of this phenomenon.
12. See id. at 1486-87 (discussing situations in which market pressures are absent or
severely limited).
13. In a manuscript written independently of this Essay, Mark Kelman defends a similar
conclusion about the effects on work incentives of redistributive legal rules and taxes. See Mark
Kelman, Strategy or Principle? The Choice Between Regulation and Taxation 98-101
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
14. See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2; Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson,
Defining Efficient Care:The Role ofIncome Redistribution, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1995).
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important respects from that offered here; these other settings are not
discussed in this Essay. 15
II. DISTORTIONARY EFFECTS OF REDISTRIBUTIVE LEGAL
RULES AND TAXES

For two major reasons, described below, behavioral law and
economics suggests that work incentives may be distorted less by
redistributive legal rules than by taxes. It is important to emphasize
at the outset that the comparison of the two forms of redistribution
offered in this Part is limited to their effects on work incentives; Part
IV below briefly considers other dimensions of the comparison. The
point I wish to emphasize for now is that the claim of neoclassical
economics that redistributive legal rules and taxes cause the same
degree of distortion in work incentives may need to be revisited once
behavioral insights are taken into account.
A. The Processingof UncertainEvents
1. Estimation of Probabilities
A salient feature of redistributive legal rules in the tort context
is the uncertainty of their application to any given actor. The effect of
such rules "tends to be limited to those few who become parties to
lawsuits."16 While one knows that one will have to pay taxes every
year, one knows that one is quite likely not to become involved in an
accident. In such settings, it becomes important to consider how
people estimate the probability of uncertain events.
In general, people may either underestimate or overestimate
the probability of an uncertain event. 17 Underestimation is common
(strokes and auto accidents, for example, are underestimated 8 ), but
overestimation may occur when a risk becomes highly visible or sail-

15. For a discussion of efficiency and distributional goals in the contract setting, see
Richard Craswell, Passingon the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in BuyerSeller Relationships,43 STAN. L. REV. 361 (1991).
16. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2, at 675.
17. See Colin F. Camerer & Howard Kunreuther, Decision Processesfor Low Probability
Events: Policy Implications, 8 J. POLY ANALYsIS & MGMT. 565, 566 (1989) (describing
divergence in both directions from actual probabilities or (where actual probabilities are difficult
to compute) expert judgments of probabilities).
18. See W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR
RISK 150 (1992); sources cited infra note 29.

1998]

REDISTRIBUTIVE LEGAL RULES

1659

ent to people. 19 This pattern of underestimation and overestimation
seems to hold true across a range of different cultures and different
times.2° Although a full account of what risks are underestimated and
overestimated by a given group of people at a given time may require
consideration of social and cultural factors beyond the scope of

individual psychology and, thus, behavioral economics as presently
understood, 21 behavioral economics seems to provide significant insight into the basic pattern of underestimation and overestimation of

risks.
An amazingly robust finding about human actors-and an
important contributor to the phenomenon of risk underestimation-is
that people are often unrealistically optimistic about the probability

that bad things will happen to them. A vast number of studies
support this conclusion.22 Almost everyone thinks that his or her
chances of having an auto accident, contracting a particular disease,
or getting fired from a job are significantly lower than the average
person's chances of suffering these misfortunes; estimates range from
twenty to eighty percent below the average person's probability.2
Likewise, on a more anecdotal level, if one surveys students anonymously at the beginning of a course, very few (if any) will predict that
their final grade will be below the average grade in the course. Of
course, these beliefs cannot all be correct; if everyone were below (or
above) "average," then the average would be lower (or higher).2
19. See VISCUSI, supra note 18, at 150.
20. See Vincent T. Covello & Branden B. Johnson, The Social and Cultural Construction
of Risk: Issues, Methods, and Case Studies, in THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF
RIS= ESSAYS ON RISK SELECTION AND PERCEPTION vii, viii-ix (Branden B. Johnson & Vincent T.
Covello eds., 1987).
2L See id. at viii-xii.
22. A bibliography (unpublished, on file with the author) containing nearly 200 articles on
unrealistic optimism is available from Neil Weinstein, one of the early contributors to this
literature.
23. See David M. DeJoy, The Optimism Bias and Traffic Accident Risk Perception, 21
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 333, 336-37 & tbl.3 (1989); John P. Kirscht, Don P. Haefner,
S. Stephen Kegeles, & Irwin M. Rosenstock, A NationalStudy of HealthBeliefs, 7 J. HEALTH &
HUM. BEHAV. 248, 250-51 (1966); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life
Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 809-12 (1980).
24. An interesting subtlety here is that if the question is whether one's probability of experiencing a bad event is below the average probability of experiencing that event (as distinguished from the average person's probability of experiencing that event), then it is possible for
most people to be below average. To illustrate, suppose that for 80% of the population the
probability of getting fired from a job is 10%, and for 20% it is 60%. Then the average probability of getting fired is 20% (.1 x .8 + .6 x .2 = .2). So for 80% of the population, the probability of
getting fired (10%) is below the average probability (20%). But the average person has a 10%
chance of getting fired, and it would be impossible for more than half of the population to have a
probability below this. The natural interpretation of most studies of unrealistic optimism would
seem to be that they request a comparison with the average person's probability, rather than
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The phenomenon of unrealistic optimism is not, as one might
initially speculate, an artifact of using college undergraduates as
subjects in studies of the phenomenon. (One might think that
undergraduates have a more positive outlook than most postgraduates, and perhaps a more positive outlook than those who do not
have the opportunity to attend college.) Unrealistic optimism is also
evident in studies of people taken from the general population. 25 It is

also interesting to note that people display unrealistic optimism even
when not asked to make direct comparisons between themselves and
others; in one study, the first group of subjects was asked to estimate
their own probability of contracting various diseases, and the second
(randomly-selected) group was asked to estimate the probability that
someone their age would contract those diseases; the latter group
gave much higher probabilities than the former. 26
Unrealistic
optimism is also apparent for both low-probability and highprobability events.27 And unrealistic optimism appears to reflect not
overestimation of the probability that negative events will happen to
others, but rather underestimation of the probability that they will
happen to oneself, for instance, people not only think (as noted above)
that the probability of their being involved in an auto accident is
lower than the average person's probability, 2S but also think that their
probability is lower than the actual probability. 29 (They also appear to
think that the probability of an auto accident in the general
population-that is, for others rather than for themselves-is less
than the actual probability; o this provides further support for the
conclusion that people are underestimating their own probability as
with the average probability; the average probability would often be quite difficult to compute

and not within the grasp of most subjects. Moreover, at least one study has dealt explicitly with
the issue raised here, see Weinstein, supra note 23, at 809, and has found significant levels of

unrealistic optimism even using the average probabilitybenchmark, see id. at 809-12.
25. See Andrew Guppy, Subjective ProbabilityofAccident and Apprehension in Relation to
Self-Other Bias, Age, and Reported Behavior, 25 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 375, 377-78
& tbl.1 (1993); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility to Health
Problems: Conclusionsfrom a Community-Wide Sample, 10 J. BEHAV. MED. 481,487-89 (1987).
26. See Kirscht et al., supra note 23, at 250.

27. See Weinstein, supra note 23, at 810 tbl.1 (finding unrealistic optimism for a wide
range of unlikely and much-more-likely events).
28.
See DeJoy, supra note 23, at 336-37 & tbl.3; Ola Svenson, Baruch Fischhoff, & Donald
MacGregor, PerceivedDrivingSafety and Seatbelt Usage, 17 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION
119, 121, 122 tbl.1 (1985).
29. See Richard J. Arnould & Henry Grabowski, Auto Safey Regulation: An Analysis of
Market Failure, 12 BELL J. EcON. 27, 34-35 (1981); Camerer & Kunreuther, supra note 17, at
566.

30.

See Sarah Lichtenstein, Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff, Mark Layman, & Barbara

Combs, Judged Frequency of Lethal Events, 4 J. EXPERIENTAL PSYCHOL. 551, 564 tbl.5, 566
fig.11 (1978).
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opposed to overestimating the average person's probability.) Finally,
there is evidence that people's real-world behavior in certain areas
tracks the predictions of unrealistic optimism; for instance, many
people fail to buy insurance against negative events such as floods
and earthquakes despite massive federal subsidies and heavy
marketing efforts by insurers3 ' (and federal aid in the event of a flood
or earthquake is not a convincing explanation for this phenomenon,
since most of those who fail to buy insurance expect no federal aid 2 ).
Of course, people in other contexts do buy insurance (for instance,
against auto accidents); the relationship between this fact and the
unrealistic optimism findings is discussed in Part H.A.2 below.
What explains unrealistic optimism? The explanation seems
to be that by thinking things will turn out well, people often increase
the chance that they will turn out well. Unrealistic optimism, from
this perspective, is generally a highly adaptive behavior (although it
may harm people in particular instances). Consistent with the
adaptiveness hypothesis, unrealistic optimism tends to correlate with
happiness, contentment, and the ability to engage in productive,
creative work."3 Also, there is evidence (although this is subject to
debate) that those with accurate, as opposed to excessively favorable,
impressions of their personal abilities (impressions that may in turn
be correlated with their impressions of the probability that a negative
event will occur) tend to be clinically depressed. 34 The adaptiveness
explanation for unrealistic optimism provides further support for the
conclusion that this phenomenon reflects not overestimation of the
average person's probability of a negative event, but underestimation
of one's own probability.
People offer unrealistically optimistic assessments of the probability of negative events in areas directly related to the effects of
redistributive legal rules. For example, most people think that they
are less likely than the average person to be sued.35 Likewise, people
think that they are less likely than the average person to cause an

31. See Howard Kunreuther, Limited Knowledge and InsuranceProtection, 24 PUB. POL'Y
227,231-39 (1976).
32. See id. at 236.
33. See Shelley E. Taylor & Jonathan D. Brown, Illusion and Well-Being: A Social
PsychologicalPerspectiveon Mental Health, 103 PSYCHOL. BULL. 193 (1988).
34. See Peter M. Lewinsohn, Walter Mischel, William Chaplin, & Russell Barton, Social
Competence and Depression: The Role ofIllusory Self-Perceptions,89 J. ABNORMAL BEHAv. 203,
207-08, 210-11 (1980). For a critical discussion of these findings, see James C. Coyne & Ian H.
Gotlib, The Role of Cognition in Depression: A CriticalAppraisal, 94 PSYCHOL. BULL. 472, 479
(1983).
35. See Weinstein, supranote 23, at 810 tbl.1.
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auto accident. 6 They also think that their own probability of being
caught and penalized for drunk driving is lower than the average
37
driver's probability of being apprehended for such behavior.
What does unrealistic optimism about the probability of negative events imply for the distortionary effects of redistributive legal
rules as opposed to taxes? People will tend to underestimate the
probability that they will be hit with liability under a redistributive
legal rule; therefore, their perceived cost of the rule will be lower. As
a result, their work incentives will tend to suffer a lesser degree of
distortion than under a tax yielding the same amount of revenue for
the government. For instance, in the numerical example from the
introduction, people may not attach an expected cost of $10,000 to a
.02 (objective) probability of having to pay $500,000 extra in damages
under a redistributive tort rule; they may tend to underestimate the
probability that they will incur liability-and thus they may tend to
underestimate the expected cost of the rule-as a result of unrealistic
optimism.38

In some cases, however, people may tend to overestimate the
probability of a negative event. Overestimation may often occur when
an event is highly salient, threatening, or otherwise highly
"available"; familiar examples include nuclear power plant accidents
and environmental issues such as contamination from toxic waste
dumps. 39 An event is "available" if it comes readily to people's minds;
events that are highly available are typically ones that have received
a great deal of media attention, and are often ones that are
intrinsically vivid or memorable, or have a technological nature. 40
36.

See DeJoy, supra note 23, at 336 tbl.1 (people think they are less likely than the aver-

age person to (1) cause a serious accident while intoxicated; (2) lose control of their vehicles and
hit another vehicle; and (3) bump another vehicle while pulling from a parking space); Svenson
et al., supra note 28, at 121 (people think they are safer behind the wheel than the average
driver); Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47
AcTAPSYCHOLOGICA 143, 144-46 (1981) (same).
37. See Guppy, supranote 25, at 378, 379-80.
38. Note that underestimation of the probability of liability would affect not only the distortion of work incentives from a redistributive (and thus, by the definition given above, inefficient) legal rule, but also the determination of what the efficient legal rule would be. If potential tortfeasors underestimate the probability of liability, the efficient (meaning optimaldeterrence-achieving) legal rule would be more generous to tort victims than the efficient legal
rule without underestimation of probabilities would be. But the newly-generous rule would not
be "redistributive" in the relevant sense, since it would not be sacrificing efficiency to achieve
distributive goals. The focus of this Essay, as stated in the introduction, is on legal rules that
redistribute wealth at the expense of efficiency.
39. See VIscusi, supra note 18, at 150; Jolls et al., supranote 1, at 1518-22; Timur Kuran
& Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, at 1-14 (Apr. 26, 1998)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
40. See Jolls et al., supranote 1, at 1518-19.

1998]

REDISTRIBUTIVE LEGAL RULES

1663

People may significantly exaggerate the probability of such events.
But this phenomenon is unlikely to affect the assessment of
redistributive legal rules, at least insofar as individuals (the focus of
this Essay) rather than firms are concerned.
Consider the
quintessential event that can expose an individual to tort liability:
the auto accident. As noted above, people appear to underestimate
the probability that they will be involved in an auto accident (relative
to the actual probability);41 this presumably results from a
combination of underestimation of the general probability of an
accident (by approximately fifty percent according to the leading
study)42 and further underestimation of people's own probability
relative to the average person's. 43 The situation would likely be
different, of course, for an event such as a nuclear power plant
accident, the probability of which might be overestimated due to its
availability. But highly available events (consider also the example of
contamination from a toxic waste dump) tend to involve firm, not
individual, liability. It is difficult to come up with examples of events
giving rise to individual liability the probability of which is likely to
be overestimated rather than (as suggested above) underestimated.
And with underestimation of the probability of liability, work incentives will be distorted less by redistributive legal rules than by taxes.
2. The Effect of Insurance
How is the analysis offered above affected by the availability of
insurance? Because insurance almost always involves some combination of deductibles, copayments, and experience rating (to mitigate
problems of moral hazard), even with insurance there will still be
some uncertainty about the degree to which a redistributive legal rule
will affect a given individual, just as there is uncertainty under a
redistributive legal rule without insurance. Part of the redistributive
cost will thus be incurred only probabilistically, depending on whether
an accident occurs. And, based on the analysis offered above, individuals will tend to underestimate the probability of being affected,
and thus their work incentives may again be less distorted than with
a tax (although the effect will be less pronounced).

41.
42.
43.
tbl..

See sources cited supranote 29.
See Lichtenstein et al., supranote 30, at 564 tbl.5.
See DeJoy, supra note 23, at 336-37 & tbl.3; Svenson et al., supra note 28, at 121, 122
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A numerical example illustrates the point. Consider the choice
between a tax of $10,000 and an increase of $500,000 in tort liability
under a redistributive legal rule that affects high-income individuals
with probability .02 (and has no effect on parties not in the high-income category). Each of these alternatives has an expected cost of
$10,000. Imagine that the tax is annual and that .02 is the probability that the average high-income individual is affected by the legal
rule in each year. Further suppose (to make the numbers work out
nicely) that the rule, if enacted, will be in effect for ten years and that
there is no discounting of future insurance payments. Now suppose
that under the redistributive legal rule, high-income individuals will
purchase experience-rated insurance against the $500,000 liability;
imagine that this insurance costs $10,000 in the first year after enactment as long as the person does not have an accident during that
year, and that, if the person has an accident, the cost of insurance
increases by $20,000 for that year and the next nine years. Likewise,
if the person, anytime during those nine years, has an accident (either
a first accident or a subsequent accident), the cost of insurance increases by $20,000 per year (above the level it occupied before the
latest accident) for the remaining years. Suppose that the basic annual premium falls to $7,750 in the second and subsequent years, so
that someone who did not have an accident would pay $7,750; someone who had a single accident would pay $27,750; and so on. The
insurance company's expected intake from a given insured over the
ten years in which the redistributive legal rule is in effect is $79,750
from the basic premium ($10,000 for the first year and $7,750 per
year for years two through ten) and $22,000 from the additional premium (probability .02 of an accident each year; $200,000 each for any
accident in the first year, $180,000 each for any accident in the second
year, and so on). The total expected intake is thus $101,750-$1,750
more than the $100,000 the company will have to pay out on an
expected basis for accidents caused by the insured.44
What is the situation of a typical high-income individual in the
redistributive tort regime? Consider, for example, an individual who,
as of year five, has not had an accident. This individual's premium in
year five will be $7,750 if no accident occurs in that year; if an accident occurs, then the individual will pay an additional $120,000 in
44. The amount that it will have to pay out on an expected basis is the probability of one
accident over the ten years (.167) multiplied by $500,000, plus the probability of two accidents
over the ten years (.015) multiplied by $1,000,000, plus the probability of three accidents over
the ten years times the cost of three accidents, and so on up to ten accidents (the maximum
number that can occur).
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premiums over that year and the five succeeding years. What will be
the work disincentive created by this regime? The expected cost of
having a high income in year five is now $10,150 ($7,750 plus .02
times $120,000). This is slightly greater than the $10,000 annual tax
that would be levied as an alternative to the redistributive legal rule.
But the analysis from above suggests that people will tend to
underestimate the probability of causing an accident and thus
incurring the additional cost; as a result, they will tend to distort
their work incentives less in response to the redistributive legal rule
than in response to the $10,000 tax.
The opposite conclusion could hold, however, if the carrying
costs of insurance were large enough to outweigh the effect of underestimation of the probability of causing an accident. The larger the
carrying costs, the larger the expected cost of the redistributive legal
rule (say, $11,000 or $12,000 in the above example, instead of
$10,150), and at some point this effect would begin to outweigh the
effect of underestimation of the probability of causing an accident. To
take a (possibly extreme) example, if carrying costs were so large that
a high-income individual paid $10,000 each year (rather than just in
the first year) as a base premium, plus surcharges for past accidents,
under a redistributive legal rule, compared to $10,000 annually as a
tax, then obviously underestimation of the probability of causing an
accident would not lead to a lower perceived cost of the redistributive
legal rule, since the fixed annual payment alone would equal the tax.
But this argument assumes that people obtain insurance coverage to the full extent of their liability (net of deductibles, copayments, and experience rating). That is, if a redistributive legal rule
exposes high-income individuals to a risk of $500,000 extra in
liability, then they purchase coverage corresponding to the full
$500,000. Is this assumption accurate? Some casual empiricism
raises questions (but does not, unfortunately, provide a definitive
answer). One-third of all vehicular negligence plaintiffs, for example,
seek or are awarded a recovery beyond the insurance limits of the
defendant, suggesting the absence of full insurance on the part of
many defendants. 45 (Of course, it is likely that plaintiffs frequently do
not even try to recover beyond defendants' policy limits, even if such

45. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System
Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 22 tbl.12 (1996). In the authors' data, the absence of

full insurance could reflect the need to pay a deductible rather than the failure to purchase a
policy with a high enough limit, see id. at 21, but the authors suggest that the latter reason is
the more important, see id. at 23 (stating that many motorists choose low policy limits).
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recovery might be legally warranted and economically feasible in light
of the defendant's assets.) Many (perhaps most) motorists appear to
carry insufficient coverage to provide complete protection against
major personal injury claims.46 Of course, of greater interest than the
overall degree of underinsurance by defendants would be the degree of
underinsurance among those most likely to be affected by (because
least likely to be judgment-proof as against) increases in tort liability
occasioned by redistributive legal rules. Unfortunately, I am not
aware of any data broken down by income in this manner.
Without such data, it is not possible to reach a definitive
conclusion about how insurance might alter the foregoing analysis of
the effects on work incentives of redistributive legal rules and taxes.
(Other data, such as the degree of experience rating in insurance,
would also be helpful.) However, even if insurance completely undoes
the effects of uncertainty on which the argument above depends, the
phenomenon of mental accounting, discussed in Part II.B below,
provides a separate reason that work incentives may be distorted less
by redistributive legal rules than by taxes.
A final comment about insurance is necessary here. One might
wonder whether the fact that many people purchase insurance
undermines the conclusion that people often underestimate the
probability of negative events. For if they think such events are
unlikely to happen, why would they buy insurance against them?
There are several responses. First, as noted earlier, people sometimes
do not buy insurance in circumstances in which it would seem that a
rational decision maker would be likely to do so.47 Second, with
regard to situations in which people do buy insurance, it may be that
a high level of risk aversion toward large losses causes them to want
to insure against such losses despite their underestimation of the
probability that such losses will occur. Even if people underestimate
the probability of a loss, risk aversion may cause insurance to remain
attractive. Note that this does not necessarily imply that people are
risk averse toward the probabilistic losses that remain after the
purchase of insurance (due to deductibles, copayments, experience
rating, and the failure to obtain coverage to the full extent of tort
liability); as will be discussed just below, there is some evidence that
people are risk seeking toward moderate losses. So the fact that
people choose to insure against some portion of the losses to which
they are exposed does not imply that their perceived cost of the losses
46.
47.

See id. at 23.
See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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to which they remain exposed after the purchase of insurance is
greater than the objective expected value of these losses. (For
instance, if the probability of incurring liability is .02 and the extra
liability under a redistributive legal rule is $500,000, the fact that a
person finds it in his or her interest to pay $8,000 for coverage against
$400,000 of the $500,000 in liability (coverage with an objective
expected value of $8,000) does not imply that the perceived cost of the
remaining probabilistic loss (a .02 (objective) probability of incurring
$100,000 in liability) is greater than or equal to a sure payment of
$2,000 (the objective expected value of this loss).) Of course, it also
does not imply the opposite; we simply do not know why people on the
one hand appear to be unrealistically optimistic and also often risk
seeking (as discussed below), but on the other hand often purchase
insurance. For those who have found my attempt to reconcile these
features of human behavior unpersuasive, I note again that Part II.B
below, on mental accounting, provides a separate reason (unrelated to
the processing of uncertain events) that work incentives may be
distorted less by redistributive legal rules than by taxes.
3. Valuation of Uncertain Outcomes
Until now the discussion of the effects of uncertainty has focused on the role of errors in probability estimation. A separate set of
issues concerns the way in which people process whatever estimates
they come up with. For instance, how is an estimated probability of
.01 viewed by decision makers? Two issues warrant brief mention.
The first is that people often exaggerate the difference between
a small (but positive) probability of a particular event and a zero
probability of that event.4 This is often called the "certainty effect."49
It might imply that people overweight small probabilities, 0 or, alternatively, it may be that people weigh small probabilities accurately
and a zero probability inaccurately. (The empirical evidence just tells
us that they overstate the difference between the two.) Thus, it is not
really clear in what direction the certainty effect cuts for purposes of
the analysis above. If people overweight small probabilities, then
there is a countervailing effect to the phenomenon of unrealistic opti48. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
UnderRisk, 47 ECONOMSTRICA 263,265-67 (1979).
49. See id. at 265.
50. See id. at 281. Kahneman and Tversky assume that a zero probability is weighted
accurately; in formal terms, they posit n(o) = 0 where n is the decision-weighting function-that
is, a zero-probability event is given weight zero. See id. at 280.
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mism emphasized above; if they weigh a zero probability inaccurately,
then the analysis is unaffected.
The second issue that warrants brief mention in connection
with how probability estimates are processed is the way in which
people view probabilistic losses (for instance, a .02 probability of
incurring $500,000 in tort liability). To the extent that people are
insured, of course, losses are no longer probabilistic, so the key
question is people's attitudes toward the probabilistic losses that
remain even after the purchase of insurance-losses that will reflect
the failure to obtain coverage to the full extent of tort liability, and
the deductibles, copayments, and experience rating associated with
whatever insurance is obtained. As to these probabilistic losses,
people may exhibit three different types of attitudes: they may be
risk seeking (the probabilistic loss is preferred to a certain loss with
the same expected value); risk neutral (the two types of losses are
viewed as equivalent); or risk averse (the probabilistic loss is viewed
as worse than the certain loss). These risk attitudes will affect the
degree to which work incentives are distorted by redistributive legal
rules and taxes. If people are risk seeking, then probabilistic losses
(associated with redistributive legal rules) will be perceived as less
costly-and thus will distort work incentives less-than certain losses
(associated with taxes); if people are risk averse, then the opposite
will be true. Unfortunately, it is difficult to be sure about whether
people will be risk seeking or risk averse (or risk neutral) toward the
probabilistic losses at issue here. Economists often assume that
people are risk averse across the board (and they invoke the fact that
people purchase some degree of insurance in support of this
conclusion). s However, there is a substantial body of empirical
(laboratory) evidence suggesting that people are risk seeking rather
than risk averse toward probabilistic losses of moderate size (for
instance, thousands or tens of thousands of dollars, as opposed to
hundreds of thousands).52 For example, in a study of MBA students,
the average subject preferred a five percent chance of losing $5,000 (in
1965 dollars) to having to pay $100 for sure, despite the fact that the

51. See, e.g., POLINSKY, supranote 2, at 57-58.
52. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 48, at 268 (finding preference for probabilistic
losses over certain losses with higher (meaning less negative) expected values); C. Arthur
Williams, Attitudes Toward Speculative Risks as an Indicator of Attitudes Toward Pure Risks,
33 J. RISK & INS. 577, 580-82 & tbl.1 (1966) (finding same preference as in Kahneman and
Tversky's study); see also Peter C. Fishburn & Gary A. Kochenberger, Two-Piece Von NeumannMorgenstern Utility Functions, 10 DECISION SCI. 503, 509-10 (1979) (finding convexity of utility
functions in losses for 20 of 28 cases, but not indicating magnitude of losses).
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expected cost of the risky option was $250. 53 The lack of a clear
conclusion about whether people are risk seeking or risk averse
toward the sorts of probabilistic losses that remain after the purchase
of insurance makes it difficult to say how risk attitudes affect the
analysis of the effects of redistributive legal rules and taxes. While
risk attitudes (like the certainty effect) could point in either direction,
the analysis of unrealistic optimism offered above provides a
systematic reason (subject to the points about insurance raised above)
to think that work incentives may be distorted less by redistributive
legal rules than by taxes.
B. MentalAccounting
The second major reason that work incentives may be distorted
less by redistributive legal rules than by taxes is that the costs imposed by the two approaches to redistribution may be attributed to
different "mental accounts." The idea behind "mental accounting" is
that people do not always view a dollar spent in the same way; it may
matter very much from which "account" the dollar is coming. Money
is not fungible in the way that standard economics assumes.
Consider this example:
Case 1: Imagine that you have decided to see a play
where admission is $10 per ticket. As you enter the
theater you discover that you have lost a $10 bill.
Would you still pay $10 for a ticket to the play?
Case 2: Imagine that you have decided to see a play
and paid the admission price of $10 per ticket. As you
enter the theater you discover that you have lost the
ticket. The seat was not reserved, and the ticket cannot
be recovered. Would you pay $10 for another ticket?
Standard economic theory predicts no difference between these two
situations. Either it is worth paying $10 to see the performance,
notwithstanding the loss of $10 (or something worth $10) discovered
on the way into the theater, or it is not. What actually happens?
Eighty-eight percent of respondents in Case I would still pay $10 for a
ticket, but only forty-six percent of respondents in Case 2 would buy a
new ticket. These results may be explained by mental accounting.
53. See Williams, supranote 52, at 580-82 & tbl.1. Only if the chance of losing $5,000 rose
to ten percent (for an expected loss of $500) would the average subject have been indifferent
between the risky option and a sure loss of $100. See id. at 582 tbl.1.
54. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framingof Decisions and the Psychology
of Choice,211 SCIENCE 453,457 (1981).
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In the first situation, the $10 ticket cost is "charged" to the
"entertainment" account; the loss of a $10 bill is charged to a different
account. But in the second situation, the $10 lost ticket is charged to
the entertainment account, and thus if a new ticket is purchased, $20
in entertainment costs will have been incurred-perhaps more than
the individual wishes to spend.
Mental accounting may also occur in the context of redistributive legal rules and taxes. When taxes are used to redistribute
wealth, taxes go up solely on account of earning more income; as one
earns more, one pays more. In this circumstance, it is reasonable to
imagine that people view the cost of taxes as a direct charge against
their incomes. Consider the receipt of an academic honorarium. My
guess is that most people view a $500 honorarium as something like
$300 in income; the tax liability is simply subtracted off the top.
In contrast, the costs of redistributive legal rules may be
viewed as expenditures out of income (rather than direct charges
against income); and heightened expenditures out of income may
produce fewer work disincentives than direct charges against income.
Why would the costs of redistributive legal rules be viewed as
heightened expenditures rather than direct charges against income?
What occasions the cost of a redistributive legal rule is not just that a
person has earned a high income, but also that the person has caused
an accident. The expenditure is not one with a sole cause-earning
more income-but rather is one with dual causes-earning more
income and being a tortfeasor (the latter of which may well loom
larger in the actor's mind). Indeed, the first cause (earning a higher
income) is not even a direct cause of the expenditure; the chain of
causation is that earning more income led the person to engage, or be
more likely to engage, in an activity (say, driving an automobile) than
the person otherwise would have been, and this in turn produced
greater exposure to tort liability. (Earning more income would be a
direct cause of the expenditure associated with a redistributive legal
rule if the rule explicitly conditioned damages on income-say,
$250,000 in liability for defendants below a certain income level and
$750,000 for those above that level; but such rules have commanded
little support among commentators5s )
Interestingly, the fact that redistributive legal rules do their
work based not only (and not even directly) on income level but also

55. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2, at 675. As this discussion suggests, neither
Kaplow and Shavell's analysis nor the analysis in this Essay assumes a situation in which
damages are explicitly conditioned on income.
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on accident-related behavior has been a significant source of criticism
in the law and economics literature. If redistribution is the goal, it is
said, then it is best achieved by directly targeting those with high
incomes. For "i]t may be that higher income persons are more likely
to be drivers than pedestrians, but certainly there are many low-income drivers and high-income pedestrians. Thus, liability rules regarding driver-pedestrian accidents are not very precise instruments
for accomplishing income redistribution."56 What this account may
overlook, I suggest, is that directly targeting high-income individuals
may increase the level of distortion in work incentives caused by the
redistribution. Again, this could not be true from the perspective of
conventional economics, but a mental accounting phenomenon may
suggest that it is. The possible cost of redistributive legal rules in
targeting less precisely the parties from whom redistribution is
sought must be balanced against the possible benefit of such rules
along the dimension of minimizing the distortion of work incentives.
Of course, the degree to which a redistributive legal rule or tax
is viewed as a direct charge against income, and hence a direct disincentive to work, may be influenced by the way in which it is presented. If W-2 forms listed expected tort obligations under a redistributive legal rule, then the costs of the rule might be more likely to
be charged directly against income. This would make redistributive
legal rules more like taxes. What about the reverse-making taxes
seem less like charges against income; would this be possible? One
might imagine strategies such as not reporting amounts withheld on
pay stubs, having the government rather than individuals prepare tax
returns, or making taxes more "hidden" in some other way (for exam57
ple, by structuring them as sales taxes rather than income taxes).
But it seems unlikely, for the reason given just below, that strategies
such as these would produce a situation in which taxes would be perceived no differently from redistributive legal rules (although taxes
might be perceived differently from the way they are perceived under
the present system) by those whose work incentives we are seeking
not to distort.
In considering the comparison between redistributive legal
rules and taxes from a mental accounting perspective (including the
issue just raised), it is useful to think about how the beneficiaries of
each of these forms of redistribution are regarded. Often the
56.
57.

POLINSKY, supranote 2, at 126.
See Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1874-86

(1994), for a discussion of some of the possibilities.

1672

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1653

beneficiaries of legal rules (even, I think, redistributive ones) are
regarded as having rights to what they receive; for instance, the tort
victim has a right to the damages paid by the tortfeasor. In contrast,
beneficiaries of redistributive taxes often are not regarded in this
way; instead, they are living off government largesse (it is thought).
Just as the beneficiaries of redistributive legal rules and taxes are
viewed differently, I want to suggest, those on the paying end will
often respond differently to the two regimes in terms of the degree of
distortion of work incentives, even if the tax regime is implemented in
a manner designed to diminish the sense that taxes are direct charges
against income.
Much more would be necessary, of course, before reaching any
sort of final conclusion about the effects of redistributive legal rules
and taxes from a mental accounting perspective. The empirical
evidence discussed above (and the other empirical evidence of which I
am aware on the topic of mental accounting) involves contexts that
are quite different from the one addressed in this Essay, and it may
be that mental accounting is a highly context-specific phenomenon.
As an illustration, the likelihood that work incentives would be
distorted less by redistributive legal rules than by taxes as a
consequence of mental accounting might depend critically on the
prevalence of redistributive rules in the legal system. At the current
status quo, the costs of redistributive legal rules might be accounted
for differently from the costs of taxes, but under a system in which
massive redistribution occurred through legal rules, it is conceivable
that people would begin to view the costs of redistributive legal rules
as direct charges against income. ss One might also argue that, even
in today's system, the costs of redistributive legal rules are viewed as
"losses," whereas the costs of taxes are viewed as "foregone gains"; in
this case behavioral economics would suggest that the costs of
redistributive legal rules could weigh more heavily on people's minds
(due to their characterization as losses). 59 Here redistributive legal
rules would lead to greater distortion of work incentives than taxes
would. But it is unclear why the costs of taxes would be viewed as
foregone gains rather than losses; my own hunch is that people
typically experience them as clear losses. In any event, future
58. Cf. id. at 1876-77 ("hidden" taxes may become visible as they become more widespread).
59. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 48, at 279 (citing Eugene Galanter & Patricia
Pliner, Cross-Modality Matching of Money Against Other Continua, in SENSATION AND
MEASUREMENT 65 (Howard R. Moskowitz, Bertram Scharf, & Joseph C. Stevens eds., 1974))
(losses are weighted more heavily than gains).
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empirical work may help to disentangle the different strands of
analysis; my only purpose in this section has been to suggest the
intuitive plausibility of the idea that under our current legal and tax
systems, work incentives may be distorted less by redistributive legal
rules than by taxes as a consequence of mental accounting.
C. Work Incentives of Redistribution'sBeneficiaries
Until now, this Part has focused on the work incentives of
those who may be burdened by redistribution; it has asked whether
work incentives are likely to be distorted as much by redistributive
legal rules as by taxes. Redistribution, however, may affect not only
the incentives of those burdened by it, but also the incentives of those
benefitted by it. Neoclassical economies would suggest that the effects on beneficiaries-like the effects on those burdened-will be the
same under redistributive legal rules and taxes; for example, if lowincome individuals face a .02 probability of becoming tort victims,
then a redistributive legal rule that imposes $500,000 extra in tort
damages (above what an efficient rule would call for) will distort the
work incentives of low-income individuals by the same amount as a
welfare or transfer payment of $10,000 would (assuming for simplicity
that beneficiaries are risk neutral).
How do redistributive legal rules and taxes compare in terms
of their effects on beneficiaries' work incentives from the perspective
of behavioral law and economics? The discussion just above (of mental accounting) hinted at one difference between the two forms of
redistribution: what occasions receiving the benefit of a redistributive
legal rule is not just that a person has a low income, but also that the
person was the victim of an accident, and the latter cause may well
loom larger in the beneficiary's mind. Thus, beneficiaries' work incentives may be distorted less by redistributive legal rules than by taxes,
just as the distortion may be less for those burdened by redistribution
when redistributive legal rules as opposed to taxes are used (as discussed above).
Uncertainty provides another reason that work incentives of
beneficiaries may be distorted less by redistributive legal rules than
by taxes. As discussed in Part IMA above, in settings of uncertainty,
unrealistic optimism may lead people to underestimate the probability of negative events. Assuming that being a tort victim is
viewed as a negative event even under a redistributive legal rule
(under which recovery is likely to be greater than it would be under
an efficient rule), underestimation of the probability of negative
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events would imply less distortion of beneficiaries' work incentives
from redistributive legal rules than from taxes. Certainly in the case
of nonnonetary harm (for example, losing a limb), it seems reasonable
to assume that being a tort victim is viewed as a negative event even
under a redistributive legal rule. In the case of purely monetary
harm, whether it would be viewed as a negative event would depend
on the magnitude of the redistribution as compared with the costs of
litigation and the limitations (if any) on recovery of damages; these together would determine whether a victim would be better or worse off
as a result of the tort, and, hence, whether the occurrence of the tort
would be viewed as a negative event. At least for nonmonetary harm,
however, underestimation of the probability of harm is likely to reinforce the effects of mental accounting in making redistributive legal
rules more attractive than taxes from the perspective of minimi ing
the distortion of beneficiaries' work incentives.

III. PROBABILISTIC TAXES?
Part II described two major reasons that work incentives may
be distorted less by redistributive legal rules than by taxes. The first
of these turned on the fact that redistributive legal rules will tend to
affect individuals only probabilistically (even with insurance,
although less so, and subject to the caveats noted in Part lA.2),
whereas taxes generally do not operate in this manner. An obvious
question raised by this account is whether a tax "lottery"--operating

probabilistically in the same way as a redistributive legal rule-might
achieve some of the benefits of the redistributive legal rule. Thus, for
example, rather than paying $10,000 in taxes for sure, one would face

a .02 probability of having to pay $500,000.
One objection to a tax lottery of this sort concerns its political
feasibility. Would the public ever tolerate it? The notion that one's
taxes would probably be zero, but might be extremely high, depending
on luck of the draw, might strike many as unacceptable. Indeed, even
economists who sympathize with various benefits of randomized tax
schemes (benefits other than those emphasized here) dismiss them as
unrealistic from a practical perspective. 0 One might wonder why the
random element of the tort system does not seem to be viewed in the
same way; presumably the reason is that one is viewed as incurring
60. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Pareto Efficient and Optimal Taxation and the New
Welfare Economics, in 2 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 991, 1012-14 (Alan Auerbach &
Martin Feldstein eds., 1987).

1998]

REDISTRIBUTIVE LEGAL RULES

1675

the cost of a redistributive legal rule because one caused an accident,
not because one's number was drawn randomly from a hat. (It is not
my purpose to suggest that this distinction makes sense, just that it
may exist.)
But apart from the political feasibility of randomized taxation,
there is another reason to think that it might not produce the desired
effect. A major factor in underestimation of the probability of negative events based on unrealistic optimism seems to be the perceived
controllability of such events. 61 Incurring tort liability, for example, is
a partial function of the individual's own acts. But a bad draw in the
tax lottery would be completely out of the individual's control. As a
result, underestimation of the probability of its occurrence might well
be far less (if it even occurred at all) than underestimation of the
probability of incurring tort liability. Thus, even under a lottery-type
system, taxes would tend to produce greater distortion of work incentives (due to less pronounced underestimation) than redistributive
legal rules would.
In sum: a tax lottery would almost certainly be politically
infeasible, and it is far from clear that it would mimic the effects on
work incentives of a redistributive legal rule in any event.
IV. OTHER DIMENSIONS OF THE COMPARISON BETWEEN
REDISTRIBUTIVE LEGAL RULES AND TAXES

A. FairnessIssues
This Essay has focused until now on whether work incentives
are likely to be distorted as much by redistributive legal rules as by
taxes. This is fundamentally a point about efficiency in achieving
redistribution; the question is which alternative means of redistribution will tend to be less costly in terms of incentives to work. A separate question is whether redistribution through legal rules that involve uncertainty in application (such as redistributive tort rules) is
"unfair," due to the fact that a relatively small number of people bear
the primary burden of the redistribution. It is precisely this feature
of redistributive legal rules that may help to reduce distortions in
work incentives, as described above; but, as Professors Louis Kaplow
and Steven Shavell point out, it also makes redistribution through
61. See Peter Harris, Sufficient Grounds for Optimism?: The Relationship Between
Perceived Controllabilityand OptimisticBias, 15 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 9, 10 (1996).
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legal rules highly "ad hoc."62 This Essay does not seek to balance
these competing considerations; rather, it simply makes the (positive)
point that along the efficiency dimension of distortion of work
incentives by redistribution, there are reasons to think that
redistributive legal rules may perform better than taxes.
B. Other Considerations
In addition to their effects on work incentives and their fairness properties, redistributive legal rules and taxes differ in several
other ways. First, as discussed above, redistributive legal rules by
definition impose efficiency costs in terms of their effects on primary
behavior. (For instance, actors may be deterred to an excessive (from
an efficiency standpoint) degree under such rules.) Second, as noted
in Part I.B, redistributive legal rules are less precise than taxes in
identifying the targets of society's redistributive intentions. (Not all
drivers are rich; not all pedestrians are poor.) Third, redistributive
legal rules are likely to compare unfavorably with taxes in terms of
the administrative costs of redistributing wealth. A large fraction of
tort judgments tends to be eaten up by attorneys' fees and other
administrative expenses, substantially limiting the amount of the
recovery that actually flows to victims. 6 3 Fourth, redistributive legal

rules are administered largely by courts (constrained, of course, by
legislative enactments), while taxes are primarily the province of
legislatures. It may be that judges are truer to society's redistributive
preferences than legislatures are (or that the reverse is true), or that
legislatures simply do not respond with changed tax regimes to
judicial decisions adopting efficient but distributively unattractive
rules.6
These factors may bear heavily on the choice between
redistributive legal rules and taxes.
V. CONCLUSION

What effect do redistributive legal rules and taxes have on
work incentives? Neoclassical economics suggests a clear answer: the
two forms of redistribution have identical effects.65 Behavioral law
62. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2, at 675.
63. See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE
L.J. 1521, 1560 (1987) (citing JAMES S. KAHALK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, RAND CORP., COSTS AND
COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION 71 (1986)).
64. See Calabresi, supra note 4, at 1224 n.36; Kennedy, supra note 3, at 469.
65. See supranotes 6-7 and accompanying text.
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and economics suggests a different answer: work incentives may be
distorted less by redistributive legal rules than by taxes, due both to
the uncertainty associated with redistributive legal rules (tempered to
some degree by insurance) and to the different ways in which the two
forms of redistribution may be treated from a mental accounting
perspective. This analysis of redistributive legal rules is of course
only suggestive; in my view, the question whether redistributive legal
rules or taxes cause greater distortion in work incentives is ultimately
an empirical one and cannot be definitively resolved by the sort of
analytic argument offered in the existing law and economics literature
and in this Essay. My only purpose here has been to examine and, I
hope, call into question the confident prediction in the existing
literature that work incentives are distorted as much by
redistributive legal rules as by taxes.
The question whether redistributive legal rules or taxes cause
greater distortion in work incentives is fundamentally a positive
question (and has been approached as such in this Essay), but the
inquiry raises a pressing normative issue as well: if redistributive
legal rules distort work incentives less than taxes do (and if this is so
for the reasons suggested by behavioral law and economics), then is it
proper for government to rely on redistributive legal rules to achieve
its distributive objectives? The advantage of these rules over taxes
stems from the fact that citizens do not perceive the same degree of
redistribution as with taxes, but is it proper for government to make
use of this error in citizens' pereeption?66 If the suggestion of behavioral law and economics that work incentives may be distorted less by
redistributive legal rules than by taxes ultimately proves to be correct
(or at least persuasive), then these normative questions about
redistributive legal rules will require our attention.

66. McCaffery, supra note 57, at 1942-43, raises similar questions about tax structures
that exploit cognitive errors.

